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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF CALI FORNI A
[38 C.2d 1; 237 P.2d 6]

[L. A. No. 21881.

In Bank.

Nov. 2, 1951.]

JOHN J. REITANO, .Appellant, v. LEON R. Y.ANKWICH
et al., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Right of Review-Loss of Right-Compliance With
Judgment.-One who pays a judgment against him under compulsion, such as under execution, does not thereby lose his
right to appeal from the judgment.
[2] Id,___;Right of Review-Loss of Right-Compliance With Judgment.-Although execution has not issued under a judgment,
payment thereof will be regarded as compulsory and therefore
as not releasing errors or depriving the payor of his right to
appeal, unless payment be by way of compromise and settlement, or under an agreement not to appeal, or under circumstances leaving only a moot question for determination. (Disapproving contrary statements in Hurt v. Bauer, 37 Cal.App.
109, 173 P. 601; Morneault v. National Su1·ety Co., 37 Cal.App.
285, 174 P. 81; Chur'chill v: More, 7 Cal.App. 767, 96 P. 108;
People's Home Savtngs Bank v. Sadler, 1 Cal.App. 189, 81
P.1029; Everts v. Matteson, 46 Cal.App.2d 14, 115 P.2d 207.)
[3] !d.-Right of Review-Loss of Right-Satisfaction of Judgment.-Mere payment of a judgment does not constitute a
satisfaction, in the sense that the litigation was intended to
be ended thereby, within Code Civ. Proc., § 1049, describing
an action as pending until final determination upon appeal,
or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment
is sooner satisfied.
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 227; 2 Am.Jur. 975.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Appeal and Error, § 104.
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MO'l'ION to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the
Superior Court of Los .Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Motion denied .
.Aaron Sapiro and Edwin M. Rosendahl for .Appellant.
David Mellinkoff for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff and appellant commenced an action
for libel and slander against two defendants. .A judgment of
dismissal, that plaintiff take nothing and pay costs and counsel
fees was rendered as to defendant Yankwich following the
sustaining of demurrers. Thereafter, a similar judgment was
rendered as to defendant Cheleden. .After entry of the first
judgment, Yankwich 's counsel wrote to plaintiff's counsel demanding payment of the costs and attorney's fees or otherwise he would be "forced" to levy execution. Plaintiff's
attorney replied by letter enclosing the amount of the costs
and attorney's fees, and stating that he understood it would
cover the costs. Yankwich 's counsel received the payment
and filed a satisfaction of judgment.
Plaintiff appeals from both judgments. Yankwich moves
to dismiss the appeal as to him on the ground that a satisfied
judgment will not be reviewed on appeal.
It has been generally stated that the voluntary satisfaction
of a judgment forecloses the right to have it reviewed on
appeal. The problem has been discussed as involving a moot
question, the lack of the existence of a controversy, inconsistency of position and that a satisfaction of judgment puts an
end to the case. In many of the cases where the statement
has been made the rule being applied is: ''That the voluntary
acceptance of the benefit of a judgment or order is a bar to
the prosecution of an appeal therefrom. . . . [It] has no
application where the benefits accepted are such that appellant is admittedly entitled to them or would not be affected
or put in jeopardy by the appeal." (Schubert v. Reich, 36
Cal.2d 298, 299 [223 P.2d 242] .) (See Stein v. Simpson,
37 Cal.2d 79 [230 P.2d 816] ; In 1·e Baby, 87 Cal. 200 [25 P.
4-05, 22 .Am.St.Rep. 239] ; People v. Burns, 78 Cal. 645 [21 P.
540] ; Estate of Shaver, 131 Cal. 219 [63 P. 340] ; Patterson v.
Keeney, 165 Cal. 465 [132 P. 1043, .Ann.Cas. 1914D 232] ;
Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 131 Cal. 639 [63 P. 1017, 82
.Am.St.Rep. 400] ; Prel?.tzsky v. Pacific Co-operative C. Co.,
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195 Cal. 290 [232 P. 970] ; Mt. Shasta Power Corp. v. Dennis,
66 Cal.App. 186 [225 P. 877] ; Union Lithograph Co. v. Bacon,
179 Cal. 53 [175 P. 464]; Graham v. Alchian, 51 Cal.App. 263
[197 P. 134]; Morton v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 496 [4 P.
489] .)
A distinction has been made, however, between an appellant receiving the fruits of a judgment and one paying a
judgment. (Hartke v. Abbott, 106 Cal.App. 388 [289 P. 206] ;
Patterson v. Keeney, supra, 165 Cal. 465; Union Lithograph
Co. v. Bacon; st£pra, 179 Cal. 53; Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud,
supra, 131 Cal. 639.)
[1] Thus when there has been a payment of the judgment
by the appellant, he does not lose his right to appeal if it is
compulsory, such as under execution or other coercion. (Hallett v. Slaughter, 22 Cal.2d 552 [140 P.2d 3]; Alamitos Land
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 Cal. 213 [17 P.2d 998]; Buckeye
Refining Co. v. Kelly, 163 Cal. 8 [124 P. 536, Ann.Cas. 1913E
840] ; Kenney v. Parks, 120 Cal. 22 [52 P. 40] ; Knight v.
Marks, 183 Cal. 354 [191 P. 531] ; Sunset Lumber Co. v. Bachelder, 167 Cal. 512 [140 P. 35, Ann.Cas. 1916B 664]; Patterson v. Keeney, st£pra, 165 Cal. 465; Vermont Marble Co. v.
Black, 123 Cal. 21 [55 P. 599]; Yndart v. Den, 125 Cal. 85
[57 P. 761]; Warner Bros. Co. v. Frmtd, supra, 131 Cal. 639;
Preluzsky v. Pacific Co-operative 0. Co., supra, 195 Cal. 290;
Hartke v. Abbott, supra, 106 Cal.App. 388; Burgess v. California Mut. B. & L. Assn., 210 Cal. 180 [290 P. 1029] ; Levin
v. Saroff, 54 Cal.App. 285 [201 P. 961] ; Everts v. Matteson,
46 Cal.App.2d 14 [115 P.2d 207] .)
Where the payment is voluntary this court has recently
stated the rule : ''It is established in this state that the general
rule that the voluntary satisfaction of a judgment deprives a
party of the right of appeal is subject to certain other wellsettled principles of law. . . . In the case of voluntary satisfaction of a judgment, deprivation of the right to appeal
ensues only when it is shown that the payment of the judgment was by way of compromise or with an agreement not to
take or prosecute an appeal." (Estate of Merrill, 29 Cal.2d
520, 524 [175 P.2d 819] .) That rule has support in other
cases. (Metcalf v. Drew, 75 Cal.App.2d 711 [171 P.2d 488];
Hartke v. Abbott, S1£pra, 106 Cal.App. 388; Warner Bros. Co.
v. Frmul, s1tpra, 131 Cal. 639; Patterson v. Keeney, supra, 165
Cal. 465.) [2] Moreover, it has been said: " . . . it is difficult to conceive how his [appellant's] payment of the judg-
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ment can give rise to any estoppel against his seeking to avoid
it for error . . . . The better view, we think, is, that though
execution has not issued, the payment of a judgment must be
regarded as compulsory, and therefore as not releasing errors,
nor depriving the payor of his right to appeal, unless payment
be by way of compromise and settlement or under an agreement not to appeal or under circumstances leaving only ·a
moot question for determination." (Freeman on Judgments,
§ 1165, p. 2410.) That statement was quoted with approval
in Warner Bros. Co. v. Frettd, supra, 131 Cal. 63~. (See, also,
2 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 221; 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 22;
4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 214b.)
There have been contrary statements. (Hurt v. Bauer, 37
Cal.App. 109 [173 P. 601]; Morneault v. National Surety Co.,
37 Cal.App. 285 [174 P. 81]; Churchill v. More, 7 Cal.App.
767 [96 P. 108], dictum; People's Home Savings Bank v.
Sadler, 1 Cal.App. 189 [81 P. 1029], dictum; Everts v. Matteson, supra, 46 Cal.App.2d 14, dictum.) The contrary statements in the last cited cases are out of harmony with the
authorities cited above and must be considered as disapproved.
In the foregoing authorities, section 1049 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was invoked,* but it was held not to foreclose
the right of appeal where the payment of the judgment by
appellant was compulsory (Kenney v. Parks, supra, 120 Cal.
22; Prelnzsky V. Pacific Co-operative a. Co., supra, 195 Cal.
290; Metcalf v. Drew, supra, 75 Cal.App.2d 711; Vermont
Marble Co. v. Black, sttpra, 123 Cal. 21; Yndart v. Den, supra,
125 Cal. 85) and the same has been held where the payment
was voluntary. (Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, supra, 131 Cal.
639; Hartke v. Abbott, supra, 106 Cal.App. 388.) [3] It may
be said that there has been no satisfaction under section 1049
in the sense that it was intended that the litigation was to be
at an end-the right of appeal waived. Brochier v. Brochier,
17 Cal.2d 822 [112 P.2d 602], in saying that a satisfaction
is the end of a proceeding adds nothing for it was not concerned with the right to appeal.
In the instant case there is no indication that the payment
of the judgment for costs was by way of compromise or pursuant to an agreement not to prosecute an appeal. The main
*Code Oiv. Proc., § 1049, provides: ''An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon
appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is
sooner satisfied.''
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portion of the judgment~~the merits of the case-that plaintiff take nothing, is the part under attack on appeal.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 18398.

In Bank.

Nov. 2, 1951.]

VERNON REYNOLDS, a Minor, etc., et al., Appellants,
v. JOHN MELVIN FILOMEO et al., Respondents.
[1] Automobiles- Contributory Negligence- Guests.- An automobile driver's negligence is not imputable to his guests.
[2] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Lights.-In an automobile
accident case, plaintiffs are entitled to have the jury determine
whether the headlights of defendant's automobile were burning
at all times pertinent to the accident, notwithstanding his testimony that they were, where an inference that they were not
could properly be drawn from evidence that, although the night
was clear and one plaintiff's vision unobstructed, he did not
see the lights of such car until it was "a foot away."
[3] !d.-Speed-Statutory Provisions.-N o change in substantive
law relating to prima facie speed limits (Veh. Code, § 511)
was made by Stats. 1947, ch. 1256, § 5, p. 2770, amending Veh.
Code, § 758, describing the prima facie limit on a signposted
area as that stated on the sign.
[4a, 4b] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Speed-Business District.-The prima facie speed limit for a business or residential district does not apply in an unsignposted area; hence,
in the absence of evidence that an area in which an automobile
accident occurred was signposted, there is no jury question
with respect to any alleged violation of the prima facie speed
[1] Negligence of driver of automobile as imputable to passenger,
note, 90 A.L.R. 630. See, also, 2 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. 552; 5 Am.Jur.
769.
[3] See 2 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp, 177; 5 Am.Jur. 645.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 144; [2] Automobiles,
§ 277; [3] Automobiles, § 94; [4] Automobiles, § 275; [5] Automobiles, § 189-1; [6, 7] Automobiles, § 273; [8] Automobiles, § 96;
[9] Automobiles, § 275; [10, 11] Automobiles, § 217; [12] Negligence, § 29; [13] Negligence, § 150; [14] Automobiles, § 273a.

